Certain apparently simple problems of coming to an agreement are surprisingly difficult to analyze in terms of individually rational behavior with a given set of preferences and beliefs. Though initially the solution appears obvious, the reasoning that would be needed to reach the solution on the part of a pair of rational individuals seems baroque and doubtful. This is used to suggest that a more fruitful tack is to analyze the situation in terms of a kind of joint or shared intentionality. If that can be invoked, what appears simple in practice will turn out to be simple in theory as well.
|Keywords||Game Theory Rationality Agreement|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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