Alpha (Osorno) 52:111-131 (2021)

Abstract
Resumen: Mediante la metodología de una reconstrucción inmanente del mejor argumento de quienes se oponen al reconocimiento jurídico del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, este artículo muestra por qué el juez o el legislador no debe aceptar dicho argumento. Con ello se señala solo indirectamente o de modo negativo por qué sí debe ser reconocido dicho matrimonio. En este artículo se reconstruye la estructura y los diferentes contenidos de las justificaciones opositoras, buscando identificar la más robusta de ellas; esto es, aquella con mayor capacidad para -recurriendo a argumentos adecuados a sociedades plurales- traspasar el peso de la prueba al lado de la demanda por dicho reconocimiento. Dicha capacidad se comprueba mostrando concretamente cómo tal justificación logra argumentos de defensa, de crítica a dicha demanda, así como incorporar argumentos del mundo progresista. Pese a su robustez y luego de una evaluación detenida, se concluye que esa justificación no es sostenible bajo medios racionales.: Through a methodology of an immanent reconstruction of the best argument of those who oppose the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, this article shows why the judge, or the legislator should not accept this argument. With this, it is pointed out indirectly and in a negative way why that marriage should be recognized. In this article the structure and the different contents of the conservative justifications are reconstructed, trying to identify the most robust of them; that is, the one with the highest capacity for -using adequate arguments to plural societies- to transfer the burden of proof to the side of the demand for such recognition. This capacity is demonstrated by showing precisely how such a justification achieves arguments of auto-defense, of criticism of said demand, as well as incorporating arguments from the progressive world. Despite its robustness and after a careful evaluation, it is concluded that this justification is nor sustainable under rational means.
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DOI 10.32735/s0718-2201202100052886
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References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation".John Finnis - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 9 (1):11-40.
Aux Bords du Politique.Jacques Rancière - 1998 - La Fabrique éditions.
The Politics of Same Sex Marriage.[author unknown] - 2007

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