British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):719-734 (1999)
In view of the arguments put forward by Clifton and Monton [this volume], we reconsider the alleged conflict of dynamical reduction models with the enumeration principle. We prove that our original analysis of such a problem is correct, that the GRW model does not meet any difficulty and that the reasoning of the above authors is inappropriate since it does not take into account the correct interpretation of the dynamical reduction theories
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Citations of this work BETA
In Defence of Naiveté: The Conceptual Status of Lagrangian Quantum Field Theory.David Wallace - 2006 - Synthese 151 (1):33-80.
The Problem of Ontology for Spontaneous Collapse Theories.Bradley Monton - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 35 (3):407-421.
Finding Your Marbles in Wavefunction Collapse Theories.Daniel Parker - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (4):607-620.
Interpreting Spontaneous Collapse Theories.Peter J. Lewis - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 36 (1):165-180.
The Parts and the Whole: Collapse Theories and Systems with Identical Constituents.GianCarlo Ghirardi - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 44 (1):40-47.
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