Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3615-3636 (2020)

Authors
Lisa Bastian
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief.
Keywords epistemic rationality  right-kind reasons  wrong-kind reasons  coherence  pragmatic reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01385-y
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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