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Morality of Belief I: How Beliefs Wrong
Philosophy Compass (7):1-10 (2023)
Abstract
It is no surprise that we should be careful when it comes to what we believe. Believing false things can be costly. The morality of belief, also known as doxastic wronging, takes things a step further by suggesting that certain beliefs can not only be costly, they can also wrong. This article surveys some accounts of how this could be so. That is, how beliefs wrong.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Order-Based Salience Patterns in Language: What They Are and Why They Matter.Ella Whiteley - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11.
Interpretation Under Oppression: Charity is Not Enough.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
The Ethics of Belief (3rd edition).Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup, The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
References found in this work
Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath, Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 181-205.
The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.
Rape Culture and Epistemology.Bianca Crewe & Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey, Applied Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 253–282.
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