Morality of Belief I: How Beliefs Wrong

Philosophy Compass (7):1-10 (2023)
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Abstract

It is no surprise that we should be careful when it comes to what we believe. Believing false things can be costly. The morality of belief, also known as doxastic wronging, takes things a step further by suggesting that certain beliefs can not only be costly, they can also wrong. This article surveys some accounts of how this could be so. That is, how beliefs wrong.

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Rima Basu
Claremont McKenna College

Citations of this work

Slurring silences.A. G. Holdier - 2025 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (2):497-525.
Interpretation Under Oppression: Charity is Not Enough.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
Wronging in believing.Lindsay Crawford - 2025 - Synthese 205 (1):1-18.
The Ethics of Belief (3rd edition).Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup, The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.

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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reasons First.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath, Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 181-205.
Rape Culture and Epistemology.Bianca Crewe & Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey, Applied Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 253–282.

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