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Morality of Belief I: How Beliefs Wrong
Philosophy Compass (forthcoming)
Abstract
It is no surprise that we should be careful when it comes to what we believe. Believing false things can be costly. The morality of belief, also known as doxastic wronging, takes things a step further by suggesting that certain beliefs can not only be costly, they can also wrong. This article surveys some accounts of how this could be so. That is, how beliefs wrong.Author's Profile
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Similar books and articles
Morality of Belief II: Three Challenges and An Extension.Rima Basu - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
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