Risky Inquiry: Developing an Ethics for Philosophical Practice

Hypatia 38:275-293 (2023)
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Abstract

Philosophical inquiry strives to be the unencumbered exploration of ideas. That is, unlike scientific research which is subject to ethical oversight, it is commonly thought that it would either be inappropriate, or that it would undermine what philosophy fundamentally is, if philosophical research were subject to similar ethical oversight. Against this, I argue that philosophy is in need of a reckoning. Philosophical inquiry is a morally hazardous practice with its own risks. There are risks present in the methods we employ, risks inherent in the content of the views under consideration, and risks to the subjects of our inquiry. Likely, there are more risks still. However, by starting with the identification of these three risks we can demonstrate not only why an ethics of practice is needed but also which avenues are the most promising for developing an ethics for philosophical practice. Although we might be in the business of asking questions, we do not absolve ourselves of responsibility for the risks that inquiry incurs.

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Rima Basu
Claremont McKenna College

Citations of this work

The Importance of Forgetting.Rima Basu - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):471-490.
Against Publishing Without Belief: Fake News, Misinformation, and Perverse Publishing Incentives.Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
How do lines of inquiry unfold? Insights from journalism.Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Special Issue on Applied Epistemology.
(When) Are Authors Culpable for Causing Harm?Marcus Arvan - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (1-2):47-78.

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 181-205.
Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.
The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory.Marilyn Frye - 1983 - Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press.

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