Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23 (2019)

Authors
Rima Basu
Claremont McKenna College
Abstract
Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist belief reflects a failure to not only attend to the epistemic risk of being wrong, but also a failure to attend to the distinctively moral risk of wronging others given what we believe.
Keywords Moral Encroachment  Pragmatic Encroachment  Doxastic Wronging  Ethics of Belief  Stakes
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12137
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References found in this work BETA

The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.
Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.
Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method.Matthew Andler - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (2):205-227.
Regrettable Beliefs.Mica Rapstine - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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