What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other

Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931 (2019)

Authors
Rima Basu
Claremont McKenna College
Abstract
This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other.
Keywords Epistemic duties  Epistemic obligations  Doxastic wronging  Ethics of Belief  Wronging Beliefs
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Reprint years 2019
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1219-z
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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Citations of this work BETA

Failing to Treat Persons as Individuals.Erin Beeghly - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.

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