Informal Logic 30 (4):361-390 (2010)

Authors
Heather Battaly
University of Connecticut
Abstract
The recent literature on ad hominem argument contends that the speaker’s character is sometimes relevant to evaluating what she says. This effort to redeem ad hominems requires an analysis of character that explains why and how character is relevant. I argue that virtue epistemology supplies this analysis. Three sorts of ad hominems that attack the speaker’s intellectual character are legitimate. They attack a speaker’s: (1) possession of reliabilist vices; or (2) possession of responsibilist vices; or (3) failure to perform intellectually virtuous acts. Legitimate ad hominems conclude that we should not believe what a speaker says solely on her say-so
Keywords moral virtue  virtue epistemology  ad hominem argument  intellectual virtue  moral vice  intellectual vice
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References found in this work BETA

On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Charging Others With Epistemic Vice.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):181-197.

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