Etchemendy, Tarski, and logical consequence

Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):47-54 (1999)
John Etchemendy (1990) has argued that Tarski's definition of logical consequence fails as an adequate philosophical analysis. Since then, Greg Ray (1996) has defended Tarski's analysis against Etchemendy's criticisms. Here, I'll argue that--even given Ray's defense of Tarski's definition--we may nevertheless lay claim to the conditional conclusion that 'if' Tarski intended a conceptual analysis of logical consequence, 'then' it fails as such. Secondly, I'll give some reasons to think that Tarski 'did' intend a conceptual analysis of logical consequence
Keywords logical consequence  Tarski  Etchemendy
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DOI 10.5840/swphilreview199915119
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