Authors
Robert W. Batterman
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
This paper concerns what Jerry Fodor calls a 'metaphysical mystery': How can there by macroregularities that are realized by wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanisms? But the answer to this question is not as mysterious as many, including Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, and Jerry Fodor might think. The multiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as psychology is best understood as a kind of universality, where 'universality' is used in the technical sense one finds in the physics literature. It is argued that the same explanatory strategy used by physicists to provide understanding of universal behavior in physics can be used to explain how special science properties can be heterogeneously multiply realized.
Keywords Multiple Realisation   Explanation   Mind   Philosophy of Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/51.1.115
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,605
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back.Ned Block - 1997 - Noûs 31 (s11):107-132.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science.Robert W. Batterman - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):1-25.
Emergent Properties.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Emergence, Singularities, and Symmetry Breaking.Robert W. Batterman - 2011 - Foundations of Physics 41 (6):1031-1050.

View all 91 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Multiple Realizability Does Not Show.Robert Francescotti - 1997 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.
Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back.Ned Block - 1997 - Noûs 31 (s11):107-132.
A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.
Constructival Plasticity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (1):51-75.
The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.
Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
Connectionism, Reduction, and Multiple Realizability.John Bickle - 1995 - Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
117 ( #94,445 of 2,461,408 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #178,452 of 2,461,408 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes