Sosa's Reflective Knowledge: How damaging is epistemic circularity?

Synthese 188 (2):289-308 (2012)

Heather Battaly
University of Connecticut
The problem of epistemic circularity maintains that we cannot know that our central belief-forming practices (faculties) are reliable without vicious circularity. Ernest Sosa's Reflective Knowledge (2009) offers a solution to this problem. Sosa argues that epistemic circularity is virtuous rather than vicious: it is not damaging. Contra Sosa, I contend that epistemic circularity is damaging. Section 1 provides an overview of Sosa's solution. Section 2 focuses on Sosa's reply to the Crystal ballgazer Objection. Section 2 also contends that epistemic circularity does not prevent us from tóng justified in (e. g.) perceptual beliefs, or from being justified in believing that (e. g.) sense perception is reliable. But, Sect. 3 argues that it does prevent us from being able to satisfactorily show that our central belief-forming practices (faculties) are reliable. That is, epistemic circularity prevents us from distinguishing between reliable and unreliable practices, from guiding ourselves to use reliable practices and avoid unreliable ones, and from defending reliable practices against skepticism. Hence, epistemic circularity is still damaging. The concluding section suggests that this has repercussions for Sosa's analysis of the value of reflective knowledge
Keywords William Alston  Epistemic circularity  Epistemic justification  Externalism  Internalism  Knowledge  Problem of the criterion  Reflective knowledge  Ernest Sosa  Skepticism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9928-2
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
Reflective Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in Perspective.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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