The old problem of induction and the new reflective equilibrium

Dialectica 59 (3):347–356 (2005)
Abstract
In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders Goodman's dissolution viciously circular. This paper, then, examines how the old problem of induction crept back in while nobody was looking.
Keywords reflective equilibrium  intuitions as evidence  problem of induction
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01016.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,317
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
210 ( #22,056 of 2,223,814 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #20,886 of 2,223,814 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature