A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception

Abstract
Abstract Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant's account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant's tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the case, for, as I will argue, the appearance of contradiction in his account stems from the failure of some commentators to pay sufficient attention to Kant's developmental approach to philosophy. Although he begins by asserting the independence of intuition, Kant proceeds from this nonconceptualist starting point to reveal a deeper connection between intuitions and concepts. On this reading, Kant's seemingly conflicting claims are actually the result of a careful and deliberate strategy for gradually convincing his readers of the conceptual nature of perception
Keywords Kant  Intuition  Concepts  Perception  Conceptualism  Transcendental Deduction
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DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2012.678603
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References found in this work BETA
Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Henry E. Allison - 1988 - Yale University Press.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

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Citations of this work BETA
Self-Affection and Pure Intuition in Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):627-643.
Kant on the Original Synthesis of Understanding and Sensibility.Jessica J. Williams - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (1):66-86.

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2012-04-24

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