¿Descripciones definidas referenciales?

Princípios 18 (29):285-298 (2011)

Authors
Pierre Baumann
University of Puerto Rico
Abstract
This paper questions the claim that definite descriptions have a referential semantics. Two possible definitions of “referential meaning” are discussed, and it is argued that definite descriptions are not referential according to either one. Devitt’s (2004, 2007) recent account of descriptions’ referential meaning is also briefly examined, and some problems with it are pointed out. It is suggested (though not shown) that the troubles with specifying exactly in what sense definite descriptions are referential point to the incoherence of the very notion of semantic reference and support instead a pragmatic understanding of reference. In Spanish.
Keywords Definite descriptions  Referential/attributive distinction  Reference  Semantics/pragmatics distinction
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References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
On Referring.P. F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.

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