Empiricism, stances, and the problem of voluntarism

Synthese 178 (1):27-36 (2011)
Classical empiricism leads to notorious problems having to do with the (at least prima facie) lack of an acceptable empiricist justification of empiricism itself. Bas van Fraassen claims that his idea of the “empirical stance” can deal with such problems. I argue, however, that this view entails a very problematic form of voluntarism which comes with the threat of latent irrationality and normative inadequacy. However, there is also a certain element of truth in such a voluntarism. The main difficulty consists in finding an acceptable form of voluntarism.
Keywords Empiricism  Empirical stance  Epistemic voluntarism  Bas van Fraassen
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References found in this work BETA
Bas C. van Fraassen (2010). Belief and the Will. In Antony Eagle (ed.), Journal of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 235-256.
C. van Fraassen (1984). Belief and the Will. Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2005). The Empirical Stance Vs. The Critical Attitude. South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):200-223.

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