Knowledge across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism

Dialogue 55 (2):363-380 (2016)

Authors
Peter Baumann
Swarthmore College
Abstract
The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject—sensitive invariantism—the view that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.) but also by non—epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject—sensitive invariantism either runs into a contradiction or has to make very implausible assumptions. The problem has been very much neglected but is so serious that one should look for alternative accounts of knowledge.
Keywords knowledge  context  subject-sensitive invariantism
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1017/s0012217316000317
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References found in this work BETA

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