Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):119-127 (2011)

Authors
Mark Bauer
University of Colorado Denver
Abstract
Shapiro has argued that the multiple realizability thesis for psychology, despite its broad acceptance, is far from being a well-established thesis. He suggests that not only do many of the standard examples of multiple realizability fail to be clearly examples but a competing thesis (“the mental constraint thesis”) that human-like minds are severely constrained in their physical realization is the more likely thesis. I will argue, however, that Shapiro’s mental constraint thesis is not a competing thesis with the multiple realizability thesis. Once it is understood how these theses are compatible, the widespread acceptance of multiple realizability looks entirely reasonable.
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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Reprint years 2012
ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview201127113
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