In Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11--27 (2012)

Authors
Peter Baumann
Swarthmore College
Abstract
This paper argues against common views that at least in many cases Robert Nozick is not forced to deny common closure principles. More importantly, Nozick does not – despite first (and second) appearances and despite his own words – deny closure. On the contrary, he is defending a more sophisticated and complex principle of closure. This principle does remarkably well though it is not without problems. It is surprising how rarely Nozick’s principle of closure has been discussed. He should be seen not so much as a denier of closure than as someone who’s proposing an alternative, more complex principle of closure.
Keywords Robert Nozick  closure
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
Causal Closure, Causal Exclusion, and Supervenience Physicalism.Kevin Morris - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):72-86.
``Nozickian Epistemology and the Question of Closure&Quot.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):351-364.
On Closure in Economics.Stephen John Nash - 2004 - Journal of Economic Methodology 11 (1):75-89.
Epistemic Closure Principles.John M. Collins - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Feser on Nozick. [REVIEW]Peter Jaworski - 2005 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7 (1):181-187.
Robert Nozick.David Schmidtz (ed.) - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 197--215.
Two Skeptical Arguments or Only One?Kevin McCain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-02-01

Total views
234 ( #33,195 of 2,330,100 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #35,214 of 2,330,100 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes