Philosophical Studies 144 (2):239-259 (2009)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
To ascribe a telos is to ascribe a norm or standard of performance. That fact underwrites the plausibility of, say, teleological theories of mind. Teleosemantics, for example, relies on the normative character of teleology to solve the problem of “intentional inexistence”: a misrepresentation is just a malfunction. If the teleological ascriptions of such theories to natural systems, e.g., the neurological structures of the brain, are to be literally true, then it must be literally true that norms can exist independent of intentional and psychological agency. Davies, for one, has argued that such norms are impossible within a naturalistic worldview. Consequently, teleological theories of mind, for example, cannot be literally true. I will show, however, that the truth conditions on normative statements do not presuppose intentional and psychological agency and, further, that a selectional regime is one naturalistic mechanism that satisfies those truth conditions. Norms, then, exist in the world independent of intentional and psychological agency
|
Keywords | Teleology Normativity Naturalism |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/s11098-008-9208-2 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - New York, NY, USA: Harcourt, Brace & World.
View all 74 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness.Ben Page - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3755-3775.
Normative Characterization in Biological and Cognitive Explanations.Mark Bauer - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (2):271-286.
Similar books and articles
Normativity and Deflationary Theories of Truth.Bruno Mölder - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):179-193.
Explaining Norms and Norms Explained.David Danks & Frederick Eberhardt - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):86-87.
Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don’T Guide.Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.
Normativity and Judgement.Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):17 - 61.
Normativity, Naturalism and Perspectivity.Kathleen Lennon - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):138 – 151.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
118 ( #100,352 of 2,518,091 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #206,034 of 2,518,091 )
2009-01-28
Total views
118 ( #100,352 of 2,518,091 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #206,034 of 2,518,091 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads