Philosophical Studies 144 (2):239-259 (2009)

Authors
Mark Bauer
University of Colorado Denver
Abstract
To ascribe a telos is to ascribe a norm or standard of performance. That fact underwrites the plausibility of, say, teleological theories of mind. Teleosemantics, for example, relies on the normative character of teleology to solve the problem of “intentional inexistence”: a misrepresentation is just a malfunction. If the teleological ascriptions of such theories to natural systems, e.g., the neurological structures of the brain, are to be literally true, then it must be literally true that norms can exist independent of intentional and psychological agency. Davies, for one, has argued that such norms are impossible within a naturalistic worldview. Consequently, teleological theories of mind, for example, cannot be literally true. I will show, however, that the truth conditions on normative statements do not presuppose intentional and psychological agency and, further, that a selectional regime is one naturalistic mechanism that satisfies those truth conditions. Norms, then, exist in the world independent of intentional and psychological agency
Keywords Teleology  Normativity  Naturalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9208-2
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References found in this work BETA

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Evaluating the Extended Mind.Benjamin Jarvis - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):209-229.
Normative Characterization in Biological and Cognitive Explanations.Mark Bauer - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (2):271-286.
Representing as Adapting.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):17-39.

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