Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's moral contrastivism

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):463–470 (2008)
Abstract
In his recent book Moral Skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Secondly, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral agency? It turns out that the last problem is the most serious one for his account.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.548.x
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References found in this work BETA
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Scepticism and Contrast Classes.Alexander Bird - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):97–107.
Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.

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Citations of this work BETA
Contesting Pyrrhonian Contrastivism.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):471–477.
A Puzzle About Responsibility.Peter Baumann - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):207-224.
Replies to Hough, Baumann and Blaauw.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):478-488.

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Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.

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