Rational Fundamentalism? An Explanatory Model of Fundamentalist Beliefs

Episteme 4 (2):150-166 (2007)
Abstract
Abstract The article sketches a theoretical model which explains how it is possible that fundamentalist beliefs can emerge as a result of an individual rational adaptation to the context of special living conditions. The model is based on the insight that most of our knowledge is acquired by trusting the testimony of some kind of authority. If a social group is characterized by a high degree of mistrust towards the outer society or other groups, then the members of this group will rely solely on the authorities of their own group for their acquisition of knowledge. In this way they can adopt a corpus of beliefs which may seem absurd from an external point of view. However, they may be locked in a “fundamentalist equilibrium” in which particularistic trust, common sense plausibility, epistemic seclusion, social isolation and fundamentalist beliefs are mutually reinforcing - and in which individuals who adopt the “fundamentalist truths” of their group do not behave more irrationally than individuals in an open society who accept the “enlightened” worldview of their culture
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2007.4.2.150
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References found in this work BETA
Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Against Gullibility.Elizabeth Fricker - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
The Role of Trust in Knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.
Epistemic Dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.

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Wittgenstein, Religious “Passion,” and Fundamentalism.Bob Plant - 2013 - Journal of Religious Ethics 41 (2):280-309.

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