WAMs: Why Worry?

Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177 (2011)
Abstract One of the most popular objections against epistemic contextualism is the so-called ?warranted assertability? objection. The objection is based on the possibility of a ?warranted assertability manoeuvre?, also known as a WAM. I argue here that WAMs are of very limited scope and importance. An important class of cases cannot be dealt with by WAMs. No analogue of WAMs is available for these cases. One should thus not take WAMs too seriously in the debate about epistemic contextualism.
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DOI 10.1080/05568641.2011.591770
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Robin McKenna (2013). Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.

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