Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):103-111 (2011)
I here argue that Ted Sider's indeterminacy argument against vagueness in quantifiers fails. Sider claims that vagueness entails precisifications, but holds that precisifications of quantifiers cannot be coherently described: they will either deliver the wrong logical form to quantified sentences, or involve a presupposition that contradicts the claim that the quantifier is vague. Assuming (as does Sider) that the “connectedness” of objects can be precisely defined, I present a counter-example to Sider's contention, consisting of a partial, implicit definition of the existential quantifier that in effect sets a given degree of connectedness among the putative parts of an object as a condition upon there being something (in the sense in question) with those parts. I then argue that such an implicit definition, taken together with an “auxiliary logic” (e.g., introduction and elimination rules), proves to function as a precisification in just the same way as paradigmatic precisifications of, e.g., “red”. I also argue that with a quantifier that is stipulated as maximally tolerant as to what mereological sums there are, precisifications can be given in the form of truth-conditions of quantified sentences, rather than by implicit definition.
|Keywords||Quantification vagueness Sider precisification mereology Lewis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Against Vague and Unnatural Existence: Reply to Liebesman and Eklund.Theodore Sider - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):557 - 567.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Universalism, Vagueness and Supersubstantivalism.Nikk Effingham - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):35 – 42.
Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument.Nikk Effingham - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):241 - 250.
On Vagueness, 4d and Diachronic Universalism.Yuri Balashov - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):523 – 531.
Metaphysically Indeterminate Existence.Elizabeth Barnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):495-510.
Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition.Elizabeth Barnes - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):105-113.
Is the Hirsch-Sider Dispute Merely Verbal?Gerald Marsh - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):459-469.
Added to index2011-02-17
Total downloads199 ( #21,288 of 2,178,174 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #39,547 of 2,178,174 )
How can I increase my downloads?