Identity through Time and the Discernibility of Identicals

Analysis 49 (3):125 - 131 (1989)
Ordinary usage gives a way to think of identity through time: the Pittsburgh of 1946 was the same city as the Pittsburgh of today is--namely Pittsburgh. Problem: The Pittsburgh of 1946 does not exist; Pittsburgh still does. How can they have been identical? I reject the temporal parts view on which they were not but we may speak as though they were. Rather I argue that claiming their identity is not contradictory. I interpret ‘the Pittsburgh of 1946’ as ‘Pittsburgh as it was in 1946’ and suggest that the apparent contradiction results from an ambiguity in the scope of ‘as’.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/49.3.125
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Meg Wallace (2011). Composition as Identity: Part 2. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):817-827.
Meg Wallace (2011). Composition as Identity: Part 1. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):804-816.

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