Authors
Benjamin Bayer
Loyola University, New Orleans
Abstract
This paper observes that in the midst of a thickening debate over the concept of “epistemic possibility,” nearly every philosopher assumes that the concept is equivalent to a mere absence of epistemic impossibility, that a proposition is epistemically possible if and only if our knowledge does not entail that it is false. I suggest that it is high time that we challenge this deeply entrenched assumption. I assemble an array of data that singles out the distinctive meaning and function of epistemic possibility, which suggest it to be distinct from other modals and an attitude toward a proposition, not a part of the content of a proposition. I suggest that this data is best explained by a positive evidentialist conception of epistemic possibility, one which maintains that a proposition is epistemically possible to a subject only if there is evidence specifically in support of that proposition that is cognitively available to that subject. I suggest that this view not only offers a superior explanation of the data, but also offers a unique and straightforward strategy for undermining skeptical arguments
Keywords Evidentialism  Epistemic possibility  Epistemic modality
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Nonfactualism About Epistemic Modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.

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