A New Response to the New Evil Demon Problem

Logos and Episteme 8 (1):41-45 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for this conclusion by making some alterations in the formulation of reliabilism, I argue that, as far as the said problem is concerned, such alterations are redundant. No reliabilist should fear the demon.

Similar books and articles

Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?Jack C. Lyons - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
Reliabilists Should Still Fear the Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (2):193-202.
The diagonal and the demon.Juan Comesaña - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.
A Challenge for Indexical Reliabilism.Balder Edmund Ask Zaar - 2023 - Acta Analytica 39 (1):143-162.
The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.
Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem.Cristina Ballarini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2475-2505.
Reliabilism and Brains in Vats.Jon Altschul - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):257-272.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-04

Downloads
1,273 (#10,231)

6 months
211 (#15,923)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Umut Baysan
University of Oxford

References found in this work

Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
Misremembering.Sarah K. Robins - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):432-447.
Confabulation and constructive memory.Sarah K. Robins - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2135-2151.

View all 6 references / Add more references