A New Response to the New Evil Demon Problem

Logos and Episteme 8 (1):41-45 (2017)

Authors
Umut Baysan
Oxford University
Abstract
The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for this conclusion by making some alterations in the formulation of reliabilism, I argue that, as far as the said problem is concerned, such alterations are redundant. No reliabilist should fear the demon.
Keywords Reliabilism  Epistemic Justification  The New Evil Demon Problem  Dispositions
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Reprint years 2017
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme2017812
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Finkish Dispositions.David K. Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Justification and Truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
The Diagonal and the Demon.Juan Comesaña - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.

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