Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions

Abstract
A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist alternative to empiricism is successful.
Keywords Delusion  Monothematic  Rationality  Campbell, J  perceptual content  Capgras  high-level content
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DOI 10.1353/ppp.2004.0033
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Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Model.G. YounG - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.
Delusions, Dreams, and the Nature of Identification.Sam Wilkinson - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):203-226.

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