Divided brains and unified phenomenology: A review essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons [Book Review]

Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512 (2005)
Tim Bayne
Monash University
In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to apply his account of the unity of consciousness to the split-brain syndrome. I provide a critical evaluation of Tye's account of the unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome
Keywords Consciousness  Content  Metaphysics  Relation  Unity  Tye, Michael
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DOI 10.1080/09515080500229993
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Split-Brain Syndrome and Extended Perceptual Consciousness.Adrian Downey - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):787-811.
A Defense of the Necessary Unity of Phenomenal Consciousness.Torin Alter - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):19-37.

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