Emergence, Function and Realization

In Sophie Gibb, Robin Hendry & Tom Lancaster (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Emergence. London: Routledge (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

“Realization” and “emergence” are two concepts that are sometimes used to describe same or similar phenomena in philosophy of mind and the special sciences, where such phenomena involve the synchronic dependence of some higher-level states of affairs on the lower-level ones. According to a popular line of thought, higher-level properties that are invoked in the special sciences are realized by, and/or emergent from, lower-level, broadly physical, properties. So, these two concepts are taken to refer to relations between properties from different levels where the lower-level ones somehow “bring about” the higher-level ones. However, for those who specialise in inter-level relations, there are important differences between these two concepts – especially if emergence is understood as strong emergence. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight these differences.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Wide physical realization.Wim de Muijnck - 2003 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):97 – 111.
Metaphysical emergence: Weak and Strong.Jessica Wilson - 2015 - In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wüthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 251-306.
Realization Relations in Metaphysics.Umut Baysan - 2015 - Minds and Machines (3):1-14.
Strong Emergence.James Miller & Alexander Carruth - 2017 - Philosophica 1 (91):5-13.
Demystifying Emergence.David Yates - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3:809-841.
Physicalism, the identity theory, and the concept of emergence.John Kekes - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (December):360-75.
The reemergence of 'emergence'.Bryon Cunningham - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S63-S75.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-03-05

Downloads
714 (#12,220)

6 months
82 (#11,971)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Umut Baysan
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Rejecting epiphobia.Umut Baysan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2773-2791.
Facts.Kevin Mulligan - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Are Propositional Attitudes Mental States?Umut Baysan - 2022 - Minds and Machines 32 (3):417-432.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
Reduction of mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.

View all 50 references / Add more references