Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (1):1-17 (2002)

Kenneth Baynes
Syracuse University
Contrary to some popular interpretations, I argue that Hegel and Habermas share many basic assumptions in their respective accounts of freedom. In particular, both respond to weaknesses in Kant's idea of freedom as acting from (certain kinds of) reasons by explicating this idea with reference to specific social practices or 'forms of recognition' that in turn express suppositions and expectations that actors adopt with respect to one another. I illustrate this common strategy in each and suggest that it may offer an alternative to Rawls's 'political' account of public reason. Key Words: freedom • Habermas • Hegel • intersubjectivity • Kant • positive liberty • practical reason • public reason • rational action • Rawls • recognition.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0191453702028001587
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 56,060
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Must It Be Abstract? Hegel, Pippin, and Clark.Martin Donougho - 2007 - Hegel Bulletin 28 (1-2):87-106.
Hegel and Respect for Persons.Arto Laitinen - 2017 - In Elena Irrera & Giovanni Giorgini (eds.), The Roots of Respect: A Historic-Philosophical Itinerary. De Gruyter. pp. 171-186.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
103 ( #95,484 of 2,403,718 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #550,229 of 2,403,718 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes