In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions

Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88 (2005)
Authors
Tim Bayne
Monash University
Elisabeth Pacherie
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained
Keywords Belief  Delusion  Doxastic  Epistemology  Imagination
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00281.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,496
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Intentional Systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Evolution of Misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493.
A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia.Lisa Bortolotti - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):879-900.

View all 33 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
224 ( #22,574 of 2,287,476 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #34,257 of 2,287,476 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature