Introspective humility

Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22 (2010)
Abstract
Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by commonsense, it is also taken for granted by many of theorists about the mind. Within both philosophy and the science of consciousness it is widely held that introspection is generally reliable, at least with respect to the question of one’s current (or immediately prior) conscious states. Without this assumption, we could not make sense of theorists’ widespread use of introspection, both in support of their own position and to undermine that of their opponents
Keywords introspection  first-person access  self-knowledge  consciousness  first-person perspective  cognitive phenomenology  grand illusion
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00176.x
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness.Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):143-164.
On the Unreliability of Introspection.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1177-1186.
Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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