Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491 (2007)

Tim Bayne
Monash University
Elisabeth Pacherie
Institut Jean Nicod
This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production
Keywords sense of agency  comparator model
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9239-9
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The Illusion of Conscious Will.R. Holton - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.

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Determinism and Attributions of Consciousness.Gunnar Björnsson & Joshua Shepherd - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):549-568.
Embodiment, Ownership and Disownership.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):1-12.

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