Erkenntnis (forthcoming)

Nathan Wildman
Tilburg University
Umut Baysan
Oxford University
In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By appealing to the disjunctive view, we argue that two hitherto unquestioned premises of these arguments are false. Furthermore, making use of the resources of this view, we formulate distinct forms of both physicalism and anti-physicalism. On these formulations, it is easy to see how physicalists and anti-physicalists can accommodate the modal intuitions of their opponents regarding zombies and anti-zombies. We conclude that these formulations of physicalism and anti-physicalism are superior to their more traditional counterparts.
Keywords zombies  anti-zombies  consciousness  physicalism  disjunctive properties
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-022-00530-0
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New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
The Character of Consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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