Two arguments against realism

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):193–213 (2008)
I present two generalizations of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism. The first replaces Putnam's model theory with some new, and substantially simpler, model theory, while the second replaces Putnam's model theory with some more accessible results from astronomy. By design, both of these new arguments fail. But the similarities between these new arguments and Putnam's original arguments illuminate the latter's overall structure, and the flaws in these new arguments highlight the corresponding flaws in Putnam's arguments
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.505.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1984). Putnam's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Timothy Bays (2001). On Putnam and His Models. Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):331-350.

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