Authors
Martin Gustafsson
Åbo Akademi University
Stina Backstrom
University of Chicago (PhD)
Abstract
In this paper, we aim to show that a study of Gilbert Ryle’s work has much to contribute to the current debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism with respect to skill and know-how. According to Ryle, knowing how and skill are distinctive from and do not reduce to knowing that. What is often overlooked is that for Ryle this point is connected to the idea that the distinction between skill and mere habit is a category distinction, or a distinction in form. Criticizing the reading of Ryle presented by Jason Stanley, we argue that once the formal nature of Ryle’s investigation is recognized it becomes clear that his dispositional account is not an instance of reductionist behaviorism, and that his regress argument has a broader target than Stanley appears to recognize.
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DOI 10.15173/jhap.v5i5.3205
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
[Letter From Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Intelligence of Virtue and Skill.Will Small - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (2):229-249.
Concepts and Action. Know-How and Beyond.David Löwenstein - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion. New Essays. London, Ontario, Kanada: Routledge. pp. 181-198.
Basic Action and Practical Knowledge.Will Small - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
Practical Knowledge and Habits of Mind.Will Small - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2):377-397.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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