Acerca del concepto de" objeto dado" en la Estética Trascendental kantiana

In this paper we intend to discuss the problem of the ontological status of the object given to the sensibility, as it is established in the §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetics . If -attending to the results of Transcendental Analytic- the object of experience can be thought only by the mediation of the categories, the significance of this reference to the given object in the Aesthetic appears as rather obscure. Many interpreters have tried to solve this problem stating that such reference corresponds to the level of common sense. We believe, however, that there is no need to appeal to such a concept, for the distinction between reality and ideality -in both empirical and transcendental senses- introduced in the §3 of the Transcendental Aesthetics as a reference to the status of space, is useful to consider the status of the given object, with important consequences concerning the interpretation of the Transcendental Idealism