An inconsistency in direct reference theory
Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593 (2004)
Abstract
Direct reference theory faces serious prima facie counterexamples which must be explained away (e.g., that it is possible to know a priori that Hesperus = Phosphorus). This is done by means of various forms of pragmatic explanation. But when those explanations that provisionally succeed are generalized to deal with analogous prima facie counterexamples concerning the identity of propositions, a fatal dilemma results. Either identity must be treated as a four-place relation (contradicting what just about everyone, including direct reference theorists, takes to be essential to identity). Or direct reference theorists must incorporate a view that was rejected in pretty much our first lesson about identity—namely, that Hesperus at twilight is not identical to Hesperus at dawn. One way of the other, the direct reference theory is thus inconsistent with basic principles concerning the logic of identity, which nearly everyone, including direct reference theorists, take as starting points.Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
DOI
10.5840/jphil20041011139
My notes
Similar books and articles
Direct reference in thought and speech.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1993 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 26 (1):49-76.
Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?Mark Balaguer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.
The fallacies of the new theory of reference.Jaakko Hintikka & Gabriel Sandu - 1995 - Synthese 104 (2):245 - 283.
A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports.Stephen Schiffer - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):361-368.
The nameability of possible objects.Alberto Voltolini - 1994 - From a Logical Point of View 3:14-33.
Undercutting defeat via reference properties of differing arity: a reply to Pust.Paul D. Thorn - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):662-667.
Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency.Andrew D. Cling - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (May):53-75.
Direct reference, direct perception, and the cognitive theory of demonstratives.Robert Hanna - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):96-117.
On How to Refer to Unobservable Entities.Greg Wong-Taylor - 2006 - Macalester Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):4-14.
Public Proper Names, Idiolectal Identifying Descriptions.Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):317-326.
Analytics
Added to PP
2011-02-25
Downloads
485 (#21,581)
6 months
70 (#15,901)
2011-02-25
Downloads
485 (#21,581)
6 months
70 (#15,901)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic: Foundations and Applications of Transparent Intensional Logic.Marie Duží, Bjorn Jespersen & Pavel Materna - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
Towards an Extensional Calculus of Hyperintensions.Marie Duží - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19:20-45.