A Non-factualist defense of the Reflection principle

Synthese 190 (15):2981-2999 (2013)

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Abstract
Are there plausible synchronic constraints on how a subject thinks of herself extended over time? At first glance, Bas van Fraassen’s principle of Reflection seems to prescribe the sort of epistemic authority one’s future self should be taken by one to have over one’s current epistemic states. (The gist of this principle is that I should now believe what I’m convinced I will believe tomorrow.) There has been a general consensus that, as a principle concerning epistemic authority, Reflection does not apply to epistemically non-ideal agents. I agree with this, but argue here that it misses the point of Reflection. Rather than an epistemic principle concerning reasons for belief, Reflection concerns the semantics of belief avowal. I present a non-factual interpretation of Reflection, argue that the principle provides a constraint on the ways in which one can reflectively endorse one’s future epistemic self, and say something about the logic governing such an interpretation
Keywords Reflection principle  Nonfactualism  van Fraassen  Rational requirement
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0114-y
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References found in this work BETA

Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 235-256.
Wide or Narrow Scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.

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