A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy

Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142 (1996)
Authors
George Bealer
Yale University
Abstract
This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified modal tie to the truth. This result is then used as the basis of the defense of the Autonomy and Authority theses. The paper closes with a defense of the two theses against a potential threat from scientific essentialism.
Keywords Epistemology of Intuition
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372777
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism.George Bealer - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
The Incoherence of Empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
Mental Properties.George Bealer - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.
Metaphysical Necessity and Conceptual Truth.Eli Hirsch - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):243-256.

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