Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):163-174 (1996)
This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central topics such as the nature of consciousness. Next a counterfactual account of intuitions proposed by Sosa is criticized. Finally, in response to certain questions raised by Sosa, the explanation of the evidential status of intuition offered in the original paper receives further elaboration.
|Keywords||Epistemology of Intuition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
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A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism.Harold Langsam - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (3):315 - 340.
Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.Harold Langsam - 2007 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):79-101.
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