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| Abstract |
This paper is a condensed version of the author’s “A Theory of the A Priori” (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2000) for the evidential status of intuitions, the incoherence of radical empiricism. the thesis of modal reliabilism, and the Autonomy of Philosophy Thesis (according to which the a priori disciplines are autonomous from empirical science).
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| Keywords | Conference Proceedings Contemporary Philosophy General Interest |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| ISBN(s) | 978-1-889680-19-4 |
| DOI | wcp20200055 |
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