A Theory of the a Priori

Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):29-55 (1999)
Authors
George Bealer
Yale University
Abstract
The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept possession: this tie is a consequence of what, by definition, it is to possess (i.e., to understand) one’s concepts. A corollary of the overall account is that the a priori disciplines (logic, mathematics, philosophy) can be largely autonomous from the empirical sciences.
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Reprint years 2000
DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.2
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Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference.Max Deutsch - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (4):445-466.
Two Kinds of a Priori Infallibility.Glen Hoffmann - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):241-253.
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
A Phenomenal Conservative Perspective on Religious Experience.Aaran Burns - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (3):247-261.

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