Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247 (2000)

Authors
Jc Beall
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection on the knower paradox provides strong support for the second. Whether verificationists want to go the route I've suggested is not for me todecide. As in the previous section my aim has been that of defending the mere viability of verificationism in the face of what many, many philosophers have taken to be its death-knell, namely Fitch's Proof. But, as the final objection makes clear, showing that verificationism can live in the face of Fitch's Proof is one thing; showing that it should live is another project. If nothing else, I hope that this papershows that verificationists still have a project to pursue; Fitch's Proof, contrary to popular opinion, need not bury verificationism.13
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DOI 10.1080/00048400012349521
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References found in this work BETA

In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Oxford University Press.
Paradox Without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251.

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Citations of this work BETA

Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at Least, Not All at Once).Greg Restall - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 339--354.

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