Frege's use of function-argument analysis and his introduction of truth-values as objects

Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):93-123 (2007)
One of Frege's most characteristic ideas is his conception of truth-values as objects. On his account (from 1891 onwards), concepts are functions that map objects onto one of the two truth-values, the True and the False. These two truth-values are also seen as objects, an implication of Frege's sharp distinction between objects and functions. Crucial to this account is his use of function-argument analysis, and in this paper I explore the relationship between this use and his introduction of truth-values as objects.In the first section I look at Frege's use of function-argument analysis in his first work, the Begriffsschrift, and stress the importance of the idea that such a use permits alternative analyses. In the second section I examine his early notion of conceptual content, and argue that there is a problem in understanding that notion once alternative analyses are allowed. In the third section I turn to his key 1891 paper, 'Function and Concept', where the idea of truth-values as objects first appears, and consider its motivation. In the concluding section I comment on Frege's general philosophical approach, which allowed objects to be readily 'analyzed out' in transforming one sentence into another.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,106
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Composition of Thoughts.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):126-166.
Soames on Frege: Provoking Thoughts.Michael Beaney - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1651-1660.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

80 ( #65,719 of 2,171,799 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #76,305 of 2,171,799 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums