A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich will enroll. There are many different things one can say about this argument, but many agree that if we do not equivocate (if the terms mean the same thing in the premises and the conclusion) then the argument is valid, that is, the conclusion follows deductively from the premises. This does not mean that the conclusion is true. Perhaps the premises are not true. However, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true, as a matter of logic. This entry is about the relation between premises and conclusions in valid arguments.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Moral Inferentialism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Mark Douglas Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.
Four Basic Logical Issues.Ross Brady & Penelope Rush - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):488-508.
Similar books and articles
Informal Logic and Informal Consequence.Danilo Suster - 2012 - In Trobok Majda, Miscevic Nenad & Zarnic Berislav (eds.), Between logic and reality : modeling inference, action and understanding, (Logic, epistemology, and the unity of science, vol. 25). Springer. pp. 101--120.
Multiple Conclusions.Greg Restall - 2005 - In Petr Hájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. College Publications.
A Completeness Theorem for Unrestricted First-Order Languages.Agustín Rayo & Timothy Williamson - 2003 - In Jc Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press.
The Cognitive Processes in Informal Reasoning.Victoria F. Shaw - 1996 - Thinking and Reasoning 2 (1):51 – 80.
Hard Cases: A Procedural Approach. [REVIEW]Jaap C. Hage, Ronald Leenes & Arno R. Lodder - 1993 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (2):113-167.
Plantinga's S5 Modal Argument, Obvious Entailment, and Circularity.Colin P. Ruloff - 2004 - Philo 7 (1):71-78.
A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument.Paul Oppenheimer & Edward N. Zalta - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):333 - 349.
Reasoning From Double Conditionals: The Effects of Logical Structure and Believability.Carlos Santamaria Juan A. Garcia-Madruga Philip & N. Johnson-Laird - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):97 – 122.
New Foundations for Imperative Logic Iii: A General Definition of Argument Validity.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2012 - Manuscript in Preparation.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads46 ( #108,077 of 2,143,766 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #386,855 of 2,143,766 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.