Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):283-328 (1984)
Functionalism would be mistaken if there existed a system of deviant relations (an “anti-mind”) that had the same functional roles as the standard mental relations. In this paper such a system is constructed, using “Quinean transformations” of the sort associated with Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. For example, a mapping m from particularistic propositions (e.g., that there exists a rabbit) to universalistic propositions (that rabbithood is manifested). Using m, a deviant relation thinking* is defined: x thinks* p iff x thinks m(p). Such deviant relations satisfy the commonly discussed functionalist psychological principles. Finally, a more complicated system of deviant relations is constructed, one satisfying sophisticated principles dealing with the self-conscious rational mind.
|Keywords||Functionalism Metaphysics Mind Self-consciousness Thinking Transformation Quine|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
Ontogeny and Intentionality.Philip David Zelazo & J. Steven Reznick - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):631-632.
Who is Computing with the Brain?John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):632-642.
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