Mental properties

Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208 (1994)
Abstract
It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity thesis, but also the metaphysical possibility of disembodiment.
Keywords Essentialism  Identity  Intuition  Mental Property  Metaphysics  Mind-body  Modality  Descartes  Twin Earth
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DOI jphil199491433
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In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
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Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.

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