On the identification of properties and propositional functions

Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14 (1989)
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Abstract

Arguments are given against the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical. The first shows that the familiar extensional treatment of propositional functions -- that, for all x, if f(x) = g(x), then f = g -- must be abandoned. Second, given the usual assumptions of propositional-function semantics, various propositional functions (e.g., constant functions) are shown not to be properties. Third, novel examples are given to show that, if properties were identified with propositional functions, crucial fine-grained intensional distinctions would be lost.

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Author's Profile

George Bealer
Yale University

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press.
Quality and concept.George Bealer - 1982 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Quality and Concept.George Bealer - 1983 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (3):347-348.
Semantics and property theory.Gennaro Chierchia & Raymond Turner - 1988 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (3):261 - 302.

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